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Cost-benefit analyses typically ignore the importance of relative position. That is, 
they do not take into account the possibility that people value particular goods, services, 
or other determinants of well-being through comparisons with others. Robert Frank and 
Cass Sunstein have recently concluded that taking into account positional issues implies 
that the benefits of health and safety regulations may be twice as large as the levels 
commonly found in cost-benefit analyses. 
  
However, the effects of positional externalities on the valuation of safety and 
health regulations, and hence the correct modifications to cost-benefit analyses, are 
theoretically ambiguous. Frank and Sunstein assume that people like others to become 
worse off and that the incomes of others are more important for comparison than their 
health and safety on the job. Because different assumptions can lead to opposite 
conclusions about the value of additional regulations, this response addresses whether the 
evidence supports Frank and Sunstein’s assumptions. 
  
The nature of relative position can be described as answers to three questions. 
First, what is the relevant group to which people compare themselves? Second, which 
characteristics of the comparison group matter? Third, how strongly do these 
comparisons affect people? This paper evaluates Frank and Sunstein’s evidence on all 
three questions.   
 
People inclined to favor the model of positional externalities espoused by Frank 
and Sunstein may find their evidence convincing, but there are appealing alternative 
explanations. There is also direct evidence that only a minority of people act in the way 
they assume. They estimate that people should be willing to spend $6,000 of a $10,000 
raise to prevent their coworkers from getting the same raise. Though some people might 
pay to reduce the salaries of their coworkers, others would surely pay to raise them. That 
many people display altruistic behavior in many situations is completely ignored by 
Frank and Sunstein.  
 
Particularly because of the variation in preferences across individuals, the 
evidence is at present too limited to permit the precise characterization necessary to 
evaluate the effects of policy. Under some plausible models, the policies suggested by 
Frank and Sunstein make people worse off; in others, better off. Though it is premature to 
incorporate positional externalities in policy analysis, such issues undoubtedly will 
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Cost-benefit analyses typically assume that the welfare of individuals from their 
own consumption of particular goods and services does not depend directly on the 
amounts of those goods and services consumed by others. Yet comparison with others is 
a constant theme in human history and literature, obvious in even the most casual 
observation of the world or (to one’s embarrassment) oneself. Given their existence, 
surely interpersonal comparisons have implications for policy-making. In a recent paper, 
Robert Frank and Cass Sunstein bring issues of interpersonal comparison into the 
analysis of policies that provide greater health and safety protections for workers.
1 The 
two are well situated to do so. Frank is as responsible as any scholar for the development 
of the economics literature on interpersonal comparisons in its modern conception, and 
Sunstein continues to lead in exploring the implications of richer models of human 
behavior for public policy and the law.  
If they are correct about the way people compare themselves to others, the 
benefits of health and safety standards in the workplace may be as much as twice as high 
as has been previously estimated. Current expenditures may be tens or hundreds of 
billions of dollars too low. Frank and Sunstein ask us to recognize that even if their 
analysis were not precisely correct, any reasonable model would imply that current 
estimates of the benefits of such regulations should be adjusted upward. Yet, as this 
response will argue, the state of knowledge on the subject is inadequate to support such a 
conclusion. The policies they advocate could actually reduce welfare. 
                                                 
1 Robert Frank & Cass Sunstein, Cost Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 
(2001). The paper also presents a considerable discussion of the recent and current use of cost-benefit 





The effect on a person’s well-being from someone else having more of one thing 
or less of another is labeled a “positional externality.” Such effects are completely 
ignored in cost-benefit analyses. Frank and Sunstein assume that people become better 
off as the amount they have relative to others increases. They further assume that people 
compare themselves to others on the basis of income to a greater extent than they do on 
issues of health and safety. In other words, they assume that relative position matters 
“less” for health and safety than for income. Such a specification of preferences implies 
that workers are in a prisoner’s dilemma situation when taking jobs. All would like to 
give up income for higher levels of safety and health protection but do not want their 
incomes to fall relative to others’. Suppose the government were to intervene by 
specifying additional protections. Then relative incomes would not change much while 
everyone would enjoy greater levels of health and safety, thus enhancing welfare.
2  
However, Frank and Sunstein’s conclusions depend upon the particular way in 
which individuals value relative position. Many different models of positional 
externalities are possible. These models differ in their answers to three questions: 
 
•  First, what is the reference group against which an individual compares himself? 
Does it include only friends and relatives or also strangers, only neighbors or also 
people in distant lands, only contemporaries or  also predecessors (or even 
successors)?  
 
•  Second, which characteristics of the reference group matter? Do people compare 
themselves on the basis of income or consumption? How much do people 
compare themselves on health and safety issues?  
 
•  Third, what are people willing to give up for position?  What is the magnitude of 
the externalities associated with different individuals and characteristics? Do 
positional externalities always make people feel worse when others do well? 
                                                 
2 Another way of thinking about Frank and Sunstein’s argument is that individuals create a negative 
externality on others when they choose income instead of health and safety benefits as part of their job 
package. As is often the case (in the absence of other distortions), the presence of a negative externality 





Could improvements in the position of the poor or of loved ones make one better 
off? 
 
The answers that Frank and Sunstein give to these questions paints a picture of 
human nature even more selfish than usual in economics. In their theory, people become 
better off when their neighbors’ houses burn down and when their friends get pay cuts. 
Soldiers don’t dive on grenades for the good of the platoon, nor do people donate 
kidneys. William Faulkner once spoke of the “universal truths lacking which any story is 
ephemeral and doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion and 
sacrifice.”
3 None of these, except perhaps pride, has a place in Frank and Sunstein’s 
model. A fuller description of human nature would include these “universal truths” as 
well as concerns about high relative position. 
Even when altruistic concerns are ignored, it is possible to reverse Frank and 
Sunstein’s conclusions. The next section offers two illustrative examples in which their 
policy recommendations are not only not optimal, but in fact make things worse.  The 
balance of the response addresses the evidence on each of the three questions. Some of 
the material presented in their paper and reviewed in this response does not directly 
address the logic for the proposal. Presumably, Frank and Sunstein incorporated the 
material to help characterize the economics of relative position, and it is evaluated in this 
response to demonstrate the extent of our ignorance about positional issues.  
 
II. Reversing the Policy Conclusion 
Frank and Sunstein’s conclusion that safety and health regulations are 
undervalued follows from the assumption that comparisons of relative incomes matter 
“more” than relative levels of safety and health. One thing mattering “more” or “less” is 
generally not well-defined in the economic theory of preferences. Consider two goods: 
water and diamonds. The way an economist would express their relative value is by the 
amount of water an individual would exchange for a small amount of diamonds given 
that the individual has particular levels of water, diamonds, and other goods. Economists 
                                                 






often make assumptions implying that an individual with very little water would be 
willing to give up more diamonds for a quantity of water than an individual with more 
water.  There is no simple sense in which either water or diamonds matters “more.” 
Similarly, in many models of positional externalities it is not possible to say which 
matters “more.” Frank and Sunstein never address this issue. In the illustrative example 
they offer, there is no benefit to having more health and safety than others, so income 
matters “more,” but they never make clear how they think people actually compare 
relative position on income versus health and safety. 
Naturally, changing the assumptions about the operation of positional externalities 
changes the results. Without challenging the underlying assumption that people feel 
better, rather than worse, when others become worse off, it is still possible to reverse the 
policy conclusion. If people care about positional externalities regarding health and safety 
“more” than income, then, unsurprisingly, they would receive an inefficiently  low level 
of income. Consequently, policies increasing health and safety on the job could reduce 
welfare. A more involved example involves people comparing themselves on health and 
safety in a self-serving way. Specifically, people may care only about their relative 
position for criteria on which they do well. If so, there need be no inefficiency in labor 
markets from the positional externalities. These particular alternative models of 
positional externalities reveal the dependence of Frank and Sunstein’s conclusions on 
their assumptions. The examples are only intended to be illustrative because, as described 
later, the data do not support a specific model.  
  
A. Smith and Jones ala Frank and Sunstein 
Economists have found it useful to present their arguments in the form of models 
in which assumptions about preferences, constraints, and behavior lead to conclusions 
about outcomes.  Frank and Sunstein present an example with these features involving 
two coworkers Smith and Jones. Both Smith and Jones get satisfaction from income, 
safety on the job, and position on the income ladder. They each confront a choice 
between a safe job that pays $300 per week and a risky job paying $350 per week. They 





the other provides a bonus equivalent to $100 per week in satisfaction. The total 
satisfaction of each is described in Table 1.  
Smith and Jones are in a prisoner’s dilemma situation in the sense that each is 
better off choosing the risky job regardless of the other’s choice. The only Nash 
equilibrium of this game is for both to take the risky job.
4 Although they would both 
prefer the outcome in which both have a safe job to the Nash equilibrium, this outcome is 




    Smith 
    Safe Job  Risky Job 
Safe Job  $400 for each  $300 for Jones 
$450 for Smith 
Jones 
Risky Job  $450 for Jones 
$300 for Smith 
$350 for each 
 
 
B. Self-Serving Positional Externalities From Health and Safety 
Suppose instead that Smith and Jones were to value their relative position on 
health and safety as well as income. In the context of the model, an individual might 
receive the $100 positional benefit only if he or she were higher on some combined 
measure of income, health and safety. If health and safety are more important than 
income, then people will choose too much health and safety on the job by the very same 
logic that Frank and Sunstein use to establish that too much income will be chosen when 
the positional externality involves only income. Currently, almost nothing is known about 
the positional externalities from health and safety, so a characterization of the trade-offs 
between relative position on income and health and safety cannot be advanced with 
confidence. One simple way of expressing different relative weights on two positional 
                                                 
4 In a Nash equilibrium, no individual wishes to change his or her choice when the choices of other 





goods is to assume that an individual cares only about the good on which she has higher 
relative position.  
There is evidence that people tend to distort their beliefs about reality to maintain 
a positive image of themselves in many domains.
5 In the case of positional externalities, 
an individual might care only about positional issues on which he or she is superior.
6 That 
is, if an individual has a lower income than a member of the reference group but a safer 
job, then the individual might get satisfaction from the greater safety, telling himself or 
herself that “it’s safety that really counts.” The other individual might say something like, 
“Real men and women don’t need jobs that safe, it’s income that matters in the measure 
of a person.” Both individuals could feel satisfaction from being better on the criterion 
“that matters.” If so, policy that reduces the externality could make individuals worse off.  
A simple extension of the previous model shows the possible effects of a self-
serving positional externality. Suppose that Smith and Jones each continue to receive 
$100 in direct benefits from having a safer job but get $50 less in pay for so choosing. In 
addition, an individual gets the equivalent of $100 for having a higher income than the 
other and $100 for having a safer job than the other but loses nothing from being lower in 
one of them so long as he or she is higher in the other. This is the self-serving part. The 
only criterion that counts is the one on which an individual is superior.  
This new situation is summarized in Table 2. The payoffs are unchanged when 
they are both in the safe job or both in the risky job because there are still no positional 
externalities that come into play. However, when one chooses the risky job and the other 
the safe job, the analysis differs. Suppose Jones takes the risky job and Smith the safe 
one. Jones receives $350 in salary, gains $100 from having a higher income than Smith, 
                                                 
5 The psychology literature reports that when a member of the reference group outperforms an individual, 
he or she may devalue that individual or the criterion. See Shelley E. Taylor, Heidi A. Wayment & Mary 
Carrillo, Social Comparison, Self-Regulation, and Motivation, in HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND 
COGNITION (VOLUME 3) 3 (Richard M. Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgins eds., 1996) (summarizing the 
literature). The issue is also addressed in Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, Explaining Bargaining 
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 109 (1997). 
6 The beginning of Leo Tolstoy’s “How Much Land Does a Man Need?” describes a meeting of two adult 
sisters. After the elder had spoken of her high living style, the younger responds, “I would not change my 
way of life for yours.” She continues, “We may live roughly, but at least we are free from anxiety. You live 
in better style than we do, but though you often earn more than you need, you are very likely to lose all you 
have…. Our way is safer. Though a peasant's life is not a fat one, it is a long one. We shall never grow rich, 
but we shall always have enough to eat.” Such a statement may be genuine, but smacks of the self-serving. 





and loses nothing from having lower safety than Smith for total satisfaction of $450. 
Smith now has $300 in salary, $100 from the extra safety, loses nothing from a lower 
income, and receives $100 from higher safety for a total of $500. Such behavior would be 
an equilibrium in that neither one of them would shift jobs given the other’s choice. In 




    Smith 
    Safe Job  Risky Job 
Safe Job  $400 for each  $500 for Jones 
$450 for Smith 
Jones 
Risky Job  $450 for Jones 
$500 for Smith 
$350 for each 
 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the optimal outcome depends on the 
model the analyst considers correct. Only a few elements of the situation are directly 
observable—for example, that the safe job pays $50 less than the risky job and that the 
workers choose the risky job. In a model with no positional externalities, the conclusion 
is simply that the value of the additional health benefits was less than $50. In the model 
of Frank and Sunstein, the conclusion is that both should have the safe job and mandated 
benefits seem like a good idea. But if the self-serving positional externality model best 
describes the situation, then the individuals would be better off having  different 
combinations of wages and benefits because such variation increases the dimensions of 
difference and allows each to think that he or she is better off “on the scale that matters” 
even though both of them have the same underlying preferences. In that case, the 
mandates proposed by Frank and Sunstein would make both Smith and Jones worse off.  
Not only do the effects of policy depend on the model, but also different models 
may be necessary to describe different people or different situations. Just as attitudes 
                                                 
7 Readers familiar with game theory may notice that this is an exa mple of what is often referred to as a 
“Battle of the Sexes” game. In addition to the efficient equilibria in which one person chooses the safe job 






towards risk vary—with some people avid skydivers and others unwilling to fly—
attitudes towards relative position may as well. As Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy point 
out, some people actively seek gossip about the rich and famous and watch television 
shows about them.
8 These are behaviors that would make them worse off under Frank 
and Sunstein’s conception of positional externalities. Perhaps the correct specification of 
positional externalities, at least for these people, means that such activities make them 
better off. Only if the answers to the following three questions are known, can even the 
direction of bias in cost-benefit analyses be derived.  
 
III. Question 1: What is the Reference Group? 
The reference group for an individual might comprise any of a number of people. 
Friends and family would likely loom large, as would coworkers. But one might also be 
attentive to those one does not know. A stranger driving by in a fine car might spark a 
flash of envy. A news report about poverty could make one feel fortunate. It is even 
possible that people could compare themselves to predecessors or successors. We may 
feel happy to be richer than those who came before us or despondent if we think about 
the tremendous luxury that will likely be available to many in the future.  Frank and 
Sunstein’s argument for greater health and safety workplace regulations requires that 
people compare themselves to coworkers. Although casual observation may suggest they 
(i.e., we) do, the paper provides no direct evidence for this conclusion. This section 
reviews the evidence on the composition of the reference group from experimental games 
and market behavior.  
 
A. The Ultimatum Game 
One source of evidence cited by Frank and Sunstein involves the ultimatum game, 
in which one player proposes an allocation of a fixed sum of money. The other player 
may accept the offer, in which case both players get the proposed division, or may reject 
the offer, in which case both players receive nothing. Play is anonymous and occurs only 
once. If the person receiving—the “responder”—were to care only about the amount of 
                                                 





money, then offers should always be accepted.
9 However, offers are often rejected. There 
are many possible motivations for such behavior, and there is no particular evidence that 
it is positional externalities that are the cause. 
Consider what would have to be true if it were in fact positional externalities that 
caused the rejection. At the time of the experiment, the reference group would have to be 
strongly weighted towards the proposing player. After all, acceptance of the division 
would increase the wealth of the decider relative to everyone other than the allocator who 
could be in his or her reference group. If the ultimatum game does in fact bear on 
positional externalities, then it supports the notion that an individual’s reference group 
may be weighted heavily toward strangers and may vary significantly in response to 
small changes in situation.
10 That is not the lesson that Frank and Sunstein take from it.  
Generally, the literature on experimental games is more ambiguous than described 
by Frank and Sunstein. A recent paper by Gary Charness and Matthew Rabin reviews the 
literature on the ultimatum game and other experimental games and conducts additional 
experiments to try to differentiate among theoretical models of behavior.
11  In their 
experiments, people often took lower payoffs so that others would have higher payoffs. 
In one experiment every single person (out of 36) chose for the other player to receive 
800 compared to their own payoff of 200 rather than both of them receive zero. In 
another, 16 out of 22 people chose to receive only 600 instead of 700 so that the other 
player would receive 600 instead of 200.
12  They never observed more than one-third of 
their subjects behaving in a manner consistent with Frank and Sunstein’s assumptions 
and “tentatively conclude” that no more than a third of people behave in such a fashion.  
                                                 
9 Statements of this sort assume that equilibrium analysis is an appropriate description of behavior. For a 
review of alternate views, see George J. Mailath, Do People Play Nash Equilibrium? Lessons from 
Evolutionary Game Theory, 35 J. ECON. LIT. 1347 (1998).  
10 The tendency for individuals to consider the situation at hand on its own and not as part of a larger 
context is common. Matthew Rabin refers to the preferences implied as “piecemeal.” Matthew Rabin, 
Psychology and Economics, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 11, 20 (1998). 
11 Gary Charness & Matthew Rabin, Social Preferences: Some Simple Tests and a New Model, working 
paper available at http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/rabin/simple.pdf. 






B. The Sisters Study 
The evidence that bears most directly on the nature of the reference group focuses 
on family members rather than coworkers. Neumark and Postlewaite studied women’s 
labor market behavior and found evidence that behavior depends on the wages of their 
sisters’ families.
13 Two results from the study are supportive of the existence of positional 
externalities. First, women work more if their sister’s husband earns more than their own 
husband. The additional work helps to narrow the difference between the woman and her 
sister’s family, thereby reducing positional externalities. Second, a woman with a 
working sister is less likely to be employed if her husband earns less than her sister’s 
husband. If a woman’s husband earns less than her sister’s husband, then her own labor 
market earnings would be less likely to result in her family having more income than her 
sister’s family if her sister is working. Both findings are consistent with the idea that the 
reference group includes other family members. Nonetheless, the study provides no 
further insights about other possible reference groups, nor does it differentiate among 
issues of income and health and safety, nor does it say much about the value of positional 
externalities relative to income.  Thus, the strong results of the paper are of limited 
usefulness for considering positional externalities in cost-benefit analysis.  
 
IV. Question 2: Which characteristics matter? 
The criteria on which individuals compare themselves to others may vary across 
the different members of an individual’s reference group. One may compare oneself on 
income to co-workers and on athletic ability to sporting companions or vice versa.  
Relative income certainly matters to people, but other things do as well, and the way they 
matter may vary across people. 
 
                                                 
13 David Neumark & Andrew Postlewaite, Relative Income Concerns and the Rise in Married Women’s 





A. Happiness Surveys and Subjective Well-Being 
As Frank and Sunstein put it, happiness surveys provide the “most striking 
evidence of the importance of relative position.”
14 Happiness surveys provide a simple 
measure of an individual’s subjective well-being by asking whether an individual is very 
happy, fairly happy or not happy. Two relevant stylized facts establish Frank and 
Sunstein’s argument that relative position is of great importance. First, within a country 
at a given point in time, happiness is correlated with income. The higher an individual’s 
income, the happier he or she tends to be. Second, there are only weak trends over time in 
reported happiness even in countries experiencing substantial economic growth. Frank 
and Sunstein claim that “these findings demonstrate that relative income is more 
important than absolute income as a determinant of self-reported happiness levels,”
15 but 
there are many other explanations for the phenomena. 
One alternative explanation for the same results is that that an individual might 
compare her current well-being to her previous well-being without regard to other 
individuals at all. Simple comparisons of an individual’s consumption to an “aspiration 
level” can have effects that are similar to positional externalities. Cross-sectional analyses 
may simply be capturing the fact that people with higher-than-average income are likely 
to have experienced recent income growth. The opposite is true for those with lower-
than-average incomes.
16 It is not clear how one would differentiate the effects of an 
aspiration level from a positional externality with current evidence. 
Another explanation for the survey results is that the scale on which people rate 
their happiness may change with economic growth. Any particular level of reported 
happiness could correspond with any level of well-being in the absence of a well-defined 
objective scale against which individuals measure their happiness.
17 (Hence the term 
subjective well-being.)  Evidence offered by Frank and Sunstein to support the use of 
                                                 
14 Frank & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 336. 
15 Id. at 338. 
16 RICHARD EASTERLIN, GROWTH TRIUMPHANT: THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY IN HISTORICAL 
PERSPECTIVE 140 (1996). 
17 There have been several attempts to deal with the problem. Some surveys specifically ask people to 
determine their own definition of happiness. See Id. at 132. Other surveys ask for comparison against a 
scale that ranges from “the best possible life in this country” and the “the worst possible life in this 
country.” See James M. Olson & Carolyn Hafer, Affect, Motivation, and Cognition in Relative Deprivation 
Research, in 3 HANDBOOK OF MOTIVATION AND COGNITION 85 (Richard M. Sorrentino & E. Tory Higgins 





happiness surveys is that there are objective conditions that affect responses. For 
example, if someone has a headache, reported happiness will decline. But this simply 
means that the scale can change for such factors as headaches, not that the scale does not 
change with persistent economic growth. Tversky and Griffin questioned whether the 
results of happiness surveys reflect a positional treadmill or a change in the response 
scale, concluding that no simple answer is possible.
18 It is still not clear how one would 
distinguish between the two explanations.  
A further problem with the use of measures of subjective well-being to learn 
about positional externalities is that they are relatively constant for an individual over 
long periods of time, yet can change significantly in response to minor events. As Frank 
has written before, happiness seems to be related to personality. “Some of us are born 
with sunny dispositions and seem to take great pleasure in our lives almost without 
reference to the nature of our objective circumstances. Yet others seem burdened by 
discontent even when, by all external measures, things are going exceptionally well.”
19  
The evidence on the determinants of subjective well-being is reviewed by Schwarz and 
Strack.
20 Seemingly minor events increase reported happiness with life as a whole. 
Finding a dime on a copy machine, spending time in a pleasant rather than an unpleasant 
room, or watching the German soccer team win rather than lose a championship game all 
resulted in increased reports of happiness and satisfaction with one’s life as a whole.
21 
The reported well-being also depends on the manner in which question is asked. Higher 
well-being has been reported in face-to-face interviews than mail surveys. Well-being is 
higher still when the interviewer was of the opposite sex but not when the interviewer 
was severely handicapped.
22 Schwarz and Strack conclude, “Although these reports do 
reflect subjectively meaningful assessments, what is being assessed, and how, seems too 
context-dependent to provide reliable information about a population’s well-being, let 
                                                 
18 Amos Tversky & Dale Griffin, Endowment and Contrast in Judgments of Well-Being, in STRATEGY AND 
CHOICE 316 (Richard H. Zeckhauser ed., 1991). 
19 ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 113 (1999). 
20 Norbert Schwarz & Fritz Strack, Reports of Subjective Well-Being: Judgmental Processes and Their 
Methodological Implications, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY (Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz eds., 1999). 
21 Id. at 74. 
22 Schwarz and Strack attribute this to not wanting to tell someone less fortunate that they were well off. 
Consistent with their explanation, a handicapped individual present in the room as another research 





alone information that can guide public policy.”
23 The results of the surveys, cited by 
Frank and Sunstein as supportive of their model of positional externalities, emphasize 
how little is known about subjective measures of well-being and the effects of relative 
position on them. 
Perhaps an individual’s well-being is not best described by “happiness.” In 
economic terms, the utility function of an individual may have as its arguments 
something other than happiness (and the things that lead to happiness).  There is evidence 
from a survey on positional externalities consistent with this. Tversky and Griffin 
describe the question and results as follows. 
Imagine that you have just completed a graduate degree in 
communications and you are considering one-year jobs at two different 
magazines. 
(A) At Magazine A, you are offered a job paying $35,000. However, the 
other workers who have the same training and experience as you do are 
making $38,000. 
 (B) At Magazine B, you are offered a job paying $33,000. However the 
other workers who have the same training and experience as you do are 
making $30,000. 
Approximately half the subjects were asked, “Which job would you 
choose to take?” while the other half were asked “At which job would you 
be happier?” … Eight-four percent of the subjects (27 out of 32) preferred 
the job with the higher absolute salary and lower relative position, while 
62 percent (21 out of 34) of the subjects anticipated higher satisfaction in 





                                                 
23 Id. at 80. 
24 Tversky & Griffin, supra note 18, at 313. Notice that the result could be interpreted as saying that a large 
majority would not be willing to pay $3,000 to reduce their coworkers’ pay by $8,000, in contrast to the 
$6,000 that Frank and Sunstein’s estimate implies people would be willing to pay to reduce their 





The usual economic conception of preferences is that they are revealed by the 
choices people make.
25 If individuals do not choose the option that would make them 
happier, then a typical economist would conclude that happiness must not be what is 
most important to them.
26 Frank and Sunstein ignore this possibility. They write that, “If 
any income loss from a regulatory intervention does not itself decrease subjective 
happiness, and if the intervention confers substantial benefits, it would seem likely that 
people are gaining rather than losing; and this is sufficient for our claims here.”
27  Only if 
reported happiness measures well-being can it be used as suggested. If well-being is 




B. Relative Position on Other Characteristics 
Frank and Sunstein do not seriously investigate criteria other than income on 
which people may compare themselves. As discussed in the first section “Reversing the 
Policy Conclusion,” positional externalities on measures other than income may have 
major implications for policy. The paper’s justification for focusing on income is the 
following.  
A bias against workplace safety would nonetheless result if concerns about 
relative income were greater, on average, than concerns about relative safety. 
Such a difference would be expected on grounds that interpersonal safety 
comparisons are difficult to observe. Such a difference might also be justified if, 
as seems plausible, safety, far more than income, is by its nature a good whose 
value depends largely, though of course not only, on absolute value. What we will 
be suggesting here is that many regulatory goods are less positional than income, 
                                                 
25 For a criticism of equating choice with preferences, see DANIEL M. HAUSMAN & MICHAEL S. 
MCPHERSON, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY (1996). 
26 It should be noted that Tversky and Griffin appeal to self-control problems to explain the result. 
27 Frank & Sunstein, supra note 1, at 339. 
28 An example of how happiness and welfare are not identical is suggested by the reaction to a major fast 
food chain’s use of beef products in their French fries. When unaware of the fact, Hindus and vegetarians 
enjoyed eating fries. After learning that they had been eating beef, they were  
extremely upset. In other words, they were happier not knowing. But, with their strong preferences, it is 





both because they are less easily observed and because people care about them 
more or less independently of what others have or do.
29 
 
There are two parts to this argument. The first is that observability affects the 
relative importance of a criterion. Just because goods subject to regulation are less 
observable, does not mean that they are not important for interpersonal comparison. It 
may be that, because of the unobservability, even the smallest scrap of information takes 
on great importance. This is an empirical issue, and Frank and Sunstein offer no evidence 
on the subject.  
The second part of the argument is that there are not “large” positional 
externalities on safety and other non-income characteristics. There is at least one study of 
positional externalities on criteria other than income. Solnick and Hemenway conducted a 
survey in which questions offered a choice between two states of the world. 
In the “positional” case, the respondent had more than others in society. In 
the other, “absolute” case, amounts for both respondent and others were 
greater than in the positional case, but respondents had less than others in 
society.
30   
 
For about half of the issues, including attractiveness, intelligence, and praise from 
a supervisor, the percentage of people choosing the “positional” answer was higher than 
the percentage choosing the “positional” answer on income.
31  Of course, results of this 
sort do not imply that positional issues are “more important” than income because the 
responses in their survey depend on the particular amounts of a good that is needed to be 
given up to achieve a particular amount of relative position. To conclude that positional 
concerns about one good, or criterion, are greater than positional concerns about another 
good requires that the issue be posed in a way that can be evaluated. The literature on 
                                                 
29 Id. at 349. 
30 Sara Solnick & David Hemenway, Is More Always Better?: A Survey on Positional Concerns, 37 J. 
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373 (1998). 
31 Another result in the survey is that the answer to the question depended on the order in which the 
question was asked. For 9 of their 12 questions, the percentage giving the “positional” answer was 
significantly higher when asked first. Again, this suggests that responses to questions on subjective well-





positional externalities has not yet specified a way to evaluate which criteria are “more” 
or “less” positional.  
 
V. Question 3: The Size of Positional Externalities 
Even if we knew without a doubt the composition of the reference group and the 
relevant criteria for each, the need for a policy response would depend on the size of the 
positional externalities. The sisters study provides some indication of the magnitude, but 
Neumark and Postlewaite do not suggest that their results can be used to determine the 
magnitude of positional externalities for income. From the ultimatum game we learn that 
a loss relative to one’s opponent, who may be anonymous, may outweigh the positional 
gain relative to everyone else. None of their sources of evidence aids in the determination 
of the size of positional externalities for health and safety, and Frank and Sunstein do not 
provide estimates of its size. They do provide estimates of the size of positional 
externalities for income, and those are reported in this section. 
 
A. The Elasticity of Position 
Frank and Sunstein estimate the value of relative position through studies of the 
elasticity of position. They define the elasticity of position on a particular criterion as the 
percentage by which an individual’s position on that criterion would have to rise to 
compensate for the effects of a one percent change in the position of others There is an 
income elasticity of position and a health and safety elasticity of position, but they only 
address income. One method they use to estimate the income elasticity of position is with 
results from minimum expenditure surveys. Such surveys ask, “What is the smallest 
amount of money a family of four needs to get along in this community?” The answer to 
such questions, report Frank and Sunstein, is typically in the range of one-third to one-
half of the disposable income of the responding family.
32 The actual share is not as 
important as the fact that there are no discernible time trends in the responses. Frank and 
Sunstein interpret the constancy to imply that individual income needs to increase at pace 
with others’ incomes for well-being to be the same, i.e., that the elasticity of position is 
1.0. They eventually choose a lower estimate constructed with a different methodology. 
                                                 





But if they think that the minimum expenditure surveys are not accurate, it would be 
useful to know what they think the confounding factors are so that we could better 
interpret the results of other methods for calculating the elasticity of position. 
 
B. Marginal Product and Employee Pay  
The second estimate for the value of relative position is derived from the portion 
of the marginal product of their labor that workers capture. Frank and Sunstein write that 
“standard labor market theories, which assume that workers do not care about relative 
position, assert that wage rates will track productivity differences on a one-to-one 
basis.”
33  Their statement ignores decades of research on the organization of the firm and 
optimal incentives inside the firm.  
One piece of evidence cited by Frank and Sunstein is that wages are sometimes 
determined by formulas that depend on experience and education rather than 
productivity. They argue that the wage can be the same for individuals of different 
productivity because high productivity workers receive additional positional benefits 
from having high status within the firm. An alternative explanation is the “influence cost” 
theory that stresses that individuals pursue their interests within organizations just as they 
do within markets.
34 If individuals are willing to expend resources to affect the decisions 
of their superiors regarding pay, position, or perquisites, then one organizational response 
is to remove the discretionary abilities of the managers to select contracts for workers. 
Such can be done through the use of fixed rules regarding compensation and the 
employment of workers under identical contracts. In contrast, the theory of positional 
externalities does not explain why contracts should be exactly the same for people of 
different productivities.  
Frank and Sunstein also claim that the relationship between interaction among 
workers on the job and the portion of marginal product they are paid supports the 
existence of positional externalities.  They consider wage data from three professions in 
1985: real estate, auto sales, and research chemistry. Of the marginal dollar generated for 
their employers, real estate agents received 70 cents, auto sales agents 24 cents, and 
                                                 





research chemists 9 cents. They assume that factors other than relative position are 
responsible for the 30 cent reduction from obtaining full marginal product and combine it 
with the 9 cents to conclude that a chemist’s salary would rise by roughly 40 cents for 
each additional dollar if factors unrelated to local rank were taken into account. (Without 
knowing what the non-positional factors are that determine the relation between 
productivity and pay, it is hard to know whether those factors are the same across 
industries as is assumed.) This exercise leads them to conclude that a research chemist 
would be indifferent between receiving a $10,000 increase in salary if all of her 
colleagues received the same and a $4,000 increase if only she received it. In other 
words, their result implies that someone would be willing to spend $6,000 of a $10,000 
raise to make sure that their co-workers get no raise instead of $10,000 each. Generally, 
their specification of preferences implies that people should be jockeying to lower the 
salaries of their friends and co-workers. It is not clear that we observe this behavior.  
Indeed, some people would undoubtedly accept a reduction in salary for (some of) their 
coworkers to get a raise. 
The economic theory of contracts often has implications for the relationship 
between an employee’s productivity and pay. Three findings from contract theory are of 
particular relevance. The first involves risk-sharing. Contract theory emphasizes that 
firms, as relatively neutral toward risk, should bear more risk than individuals.
35 If the 
variation in output were not under the control of the employees, then efficient risk 
sharing would imply that individuals receive a base salary and little of their marginal 
product even in the absence of positional externalities.  The second observation is that the 
output in teams cannot be divided so that all workers receive the full marginal product. 
This is particularly problematic because positional externalities should be observed when 
individuals interact closely as in teams. The third issue is that when incentives cannot be 
provided for some activities, employers may reduce incentives for other activities.
36 The 
                                                                                                                                                 
34 See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE (1996); Paul Milgrom, Employment 
Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficient Organization Design, 96 J. POL. ECON. 42 (1988). 
35 Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 BELL J. ECON. 74 (1979). 
36 An example of the relevance of this phenomenon is merit pay for teachers. Providing incentives for 
teachers to “teach the test” may lead them to neglect other skills such as creativity.  If so, it may be optimal 
to provide only weak incentives for teaching the test even though it would be possible to do so. Bengt 
Holmstrom and Paul Milgrom, Multi-Task Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset 





observed low portion of marginal product captured by workers would be expected if their 
productivity on other aspects of their job could not be measured. In sum, the observed 
wage patterns can be entirely explained by alternate theories.
37 That is not to say that 
some of the results are not attributable to relative position, but simply that this evidence 
cannot be used to distinguish among the theories. 
 
VI. Conclusions 
Not one of the three questions on positional externalities can be answered 
definitively. Much of the evidence is consistent with positional externalities for income, 
but equally consistent with and sometimes more supportive of other theories. The 
evidence on positional externalities from health and safety is virtually non-existent. Nor 
is much known about how relative preferences for positional externalities may differ 
across people.
38 The results of Charness and Rabin that only one-third of people display 
this sort of behavior is particularly challenging, as is the failure to observe individuals 
spending large sums to reduce the pay of their coworkers. Altruistic concerns of various 
kinds are likely to further complicate the analysis. One cannot escape the conclusion that 
our current understanding of positional externalities is limited.
39 In their paper, Frank and 
Sunstein also suggest that positional externalities that are based on envy are not a valid 
basis for policy. Given that our understanding of positional concerns is limited, 
attributing particular components of those concerns to different motivations is far beyond 
present capabilities.
40   
 
                                                 
37 There are other theories that also allow wages to not depend on individual productivity. See, e.g., George 
Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 543 (1982). 
38 Frank and Sunstein consider the possibility of variation in their discussion of relative rank. Id. at 354. 
39 There are a few sources of evidence that have not been discussed but they are among the least 
informative for cost-benefit analysis. For example, it is not clear how Frank and Sunstein’s discussion of 
biological effects of status changes could be used to answer the three questions. The reference to adult 
vervet monkeys in a policy proposal is a telling indicator of how poorly the issues are understood in 
humans. Id. at 343. 
40 If it were the case that direct evidence either confirming or rejecting Frank and Sunstein’s assumptions 
could never be developed, then changes in policy analyses would have to be based on indirect evidence and 
intuition. Agreement among scholars with extensive experience in the discipline might be a sufficient 
justification for changes in methods of analysis. However, Frank and Sunstein do not suggest that the 





Still, if our best guess is that positional externalities do in fact exist, why 
shouldn’t they be taken into account? When conventional cost-benefit analyses ignore 
positional externalities, they implicitly assume that the best way to model positional 
externalities is as if they do not exist. In Frank and Sunstein’s words, “even a back-of-
the-envelope calculation is likely to be a closer estimate than we would get by simply 
ignoring concerns about relative position.”
41 However, as the example of self-serving 
criteria illustrated, in the absence of a clear understanding of the manner in which 
positional externalities operate, even the direction of the adjustment to cost-benefit 
analysis is not known. This is true even before the economist’s ceterum censeo that the 
effects of any particular distortion depend on existing distortions.
42 
Some people may approve of Frank and Sunstein’s argument because of the 
particular policies they support: namely, that there should be greater regulation of health 
and safety in the workplace. Such people should recognize that positional externalities do 
not universally, or even predominantly, support the policy goals of one side of the 
traditionally-defined political spectrum. Any policy that explicitly promotes mixing of 
individuals with different incomes appears less attractive with Frank and Sunstein’s 
model of positional externalities. Consider “social equalizers” such as the draft and 
public schools that have been advocated by Mickey Kaus.
43 The benefit from the greater 
interaction among groups would have to be balanced against the negative positional 
externalities borne by the worse-off as a result of greater contact with the better-off. 
Likewise, there are continuing proposals for racial integration that would also result in 
greater mixing of people with different levels of income. These too may appear less 
desirable when positional externalities of the sort considered by Frank and Sunstein are 
considered.  
 
                                                 
41 Id. at 361. 
42 The idea is commonly referred to as the general theory of the second best. The most important confound 
in the case of health and safety regulations involves the differential tax treatment of health and safety 
benefits versus income. Income is of course taxed, but health benefits are not, so labor contracts would be 
expected to be distorted towards health benefits and away from income. On the other hand, without a clear 
understanding of the political economy of health and safety regulation, it may be that there is too little 
health and safety on the job. Then, even if the proposed adjustment to cost-benefit analysis were not 
justified by positional externalities, it could still be welfare-enhancing.  





Finally, if people really do wish for others to become worse off, then we would 
expect for them to try to use the political process to do so. Though this not an issue that 
has been explored in the political economy literature, one would expect that certain 
limitations on government action could be welfare-enhancing as a result.  
Without a better understanding of the nature of positional externalities and with 
the concern that an incorrect model could be damaging, it is constructive to think about 
policies that would be beneficial if positional externalities exist and neutral if standard 
models are correct.
44 For example, with a thorough understanding of reference groups, it 
may be possible to create welfare gains simply via policies that manipulate individuals’ 
reference groups without changing the goods and services available to them. There would 
be little cost to such policies in a cost-benefit analysis. Some may find this troubling. 
Paul Milgrom, for example, has opined that theories of manipulation of reference groups 
lead to “unacceptable conclusions.” He writes, “If the value of an unspoiled wilderness 
depends on human knowledge or belief about its existence, then the secret destruction of 
an environmental resource does no damage. By the same logic, real damage is wrought 
by the journalist who first publicizes the destruction.”
45 Nevertheless, the theory of 
positional externalities argues that such policies must be taken seriously.
46  
In their review of the evidence on the psychology of well-being, Daniel 
Kahneman, Ed Diener, and Norbert Schwarz conclude that the “scientific understanding 
in this field is currently woefully inadequate to provide a strong underpinning for national 
policies.”
47 It would be premature to incorporate positional externalities in cost-benefit 
analysis. Yet even if positional externalities are not taken into account in cost-benefit 
analysis, the political process can incorporate them. If the choice of wages in place of 
                                                 
44 Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin introduce the term “cautious paternalism” to describe policies that 
“can be extremely valuable if people are making errors, but they have relatively small costs if people are 
fully rational.” Although there need be no departures from rationality as defined by economists for there to 
be positional externalities, the concept is the same. See Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, 
Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 
125 (Henry J. Aaron ed., 1999). 
45 Milgrom addressed the treatment of altruism in cost-benefit analysis. Paul Milgrom, Is Sympathy an 
Economic Value? Philosophy, Economics, and the Contingent Valuation Method, in CONTINGENT 
VALUATION: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 417 (J.A. Hausman ed., 1993).  
46 There are of course many arguments against their use, but such arguments should also be applied to other 
policies justified by positional externality considerations. 
47 Daniel Kahneman, Ed Diener & Norbert Schwarz, Preface, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF 





greater health and safety is in fact a prisoner’s dilemma and individuals pay for the 
benefits they receive, as Frank and Sunstein claim, then there should be no objections to 
their proposals to expend the additional monies. Although the current evidence does not 
necessarily support a particular model of positional externalities, they surely exist—albeit 
perhaps in different forms for different people. Because of differences across people, 
there may be no single way of taking positional issues into account that is most 
compelling. Still, it is hard to believe that the time will not come when they will be taken 
into account more formally in cost-benefit studies and other forms of policy analysis. 